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Researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School and Naval Surface Warfare Center in 
Dahlgren, Virginia, have been developing an automated decision-support tool for the Navy to 
optimally allocate to firing units tasks requiring Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs).  A 
new type of TLAM firing unit, the nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine (SSGN), capable 
of carrying 154 TLAMs, will soon be operational.  We consider how to adjust the data structures 
and model of the existing TLAM allocation decision-support algorithm to incorporate the SSGN, 
and find that only minor modifications are necessary.  Furthermore, based on interviews with 
submarine officers, we validate certain SSGN operational constraints and discard irrelevant ones.  
Specifically, the algorithm must account for constraints on the maximum number of missiles that 
can concurrently be powered up, the minimum amount of time required to open and close a hatch 




Figure 1 [Federation of American Scientists, 2002a].  A Tomahawk cruise 
missile, like the one pictured above, can be launched from surface ships and 
submarines.  Allocating tasks to missiles is complicated by missile variants 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The process of assigning tasks requiring Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) to 
firing units (e.g., specific ships in a fleet) is called predesignation.  Predesignation is performed 
in two phases.  Phase 1 is conducted at the fleet level, where the Tomahawk Strike Coordinator 
(TSC) allocates tasks to available firing units.  Phase 2 refines the allocation on each individual 
firing unit given the allocations in Phase 1 [Hodge, 1999]. 
The Tomahawk missile is launched from a surface ship or submarine in support of an 
attack against a target during a strike, using information contained in the corresponding mission.  
A task is a mission with the associated period of time during which the mission is to be 
accomplished, and is sub-divided into task parts.  A primary task part is fired to accomplish the 
task.  A ready-spare or backup task part is fired if the primary missile fails to launch and is 
assigned, respectively, to the same firing unit, or a firing unit other than that to which the 
primary task part is assigned [Arnold, 2000].  We assume that the primary task part is launched, 
and that the ready-spare and back-up task parts are not. 
Currently, there are two Tomahawk missile variants, Block II and Block III.  A Block II 
missile is less capable (e.g., it has less range) than a Block III missile.  There are two warhead 
configurations for a Block II and Block III Tomahawk missile; either the missile possesses a 
conventional unitary warhead (C), or the missile possesses a submunition dispenser for the 
payload (D).  The next generation of Tomahawk missiles, the Block IV Tactical Tomahawk 
missile, will have improved avionics and performance [Navy Fact File, 2002].   
Each task requires a specific type of missile.  For example, a task whose objective is the 
destruction of an enemy command bunker requires a different kind of Tomahawk missile 
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 warhead than a task whose objective is the destruction of an enemy integrated air defense radar 
site.  However, some tasks can be accomplished with either a Block II or a Block III missile, in 
which case the TSC allocates the task to the less capable Block II missile, if possible, in order to 
preserve strike capability and flexibility for future missions.  The extent to which future strike 
capability is available is measured as follow-on strike capability or residual firepower. 
Tomahawk missiles are usually launched from surface ships via the Vertical Launch 
System (VLS).  Using this system, missiles are stored in half-modules.  A half-module consists of 
four cells, each of which contains a single Tomahawk missile.  When preparing for launch, only 
one missile in each half-module may be powered up and aligned at one time.  This limitation is 
known as the half-module constraint.  Two tasks conflict, i.e., cannot be assigned to the same 
half-module on the same surface ship, if their corresponding missiles must be launched within 
the time required for the VLS fire control system to “reset” itself.  We nominally specify this 
amount of time between launches as 45 minutes. 
Presently, the only submarine firing units that can launch Tomahawk missiles are the 
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).  An SSN can store Tomahawk missiles in its torpedo 
room.  These Tomahawk missiles are contained in canisters and loaded into torpedo tubes for 
horizontal launch.  Tomahawks can also be launched from newer variants of SSNs via the 
Capsule Launch System (CLS), analogous to the VLS on surface ships.  In this case, Tomahawks 
are stored vertically in capsules in the ballast tanks of an SSN and launched vertically from the 
capsules.  The CLS does not have the half-module constraint of the VLS; therefore, each CLS 
can be thought of as a “single-shot half-module,” or as a half-module with one cell, and 
Tomahawk missiles launched from SSNs via the CLS may be powered up and aligned at the 
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 same time.  The CLS that will be installed onboard the SSGN is similar to the CLS currently 
installed on the SSN.   
 
 
Figure 2 [Federation of American Scientists, 2002b].  An SSN launches a 
Tomahawk cruise missile.  Note the periscope of the SSN on the right. 
 
B. SUMMARY OF PAST WORK 
Since 1998, with the help of Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 
(NSWCDD), several theses at the Naval Postgraduate School have contributed to the 
development of a decision-support algorithm for Tomahawk predesignation. 
LT Scott D. Kuykendall [1998], motivated by his fleet predesignation experience, first 
addresses Tomahawk predesignation in cooperation with NSWCDD.  These motivational 
experiences are:  (i) predesignation is currently done using paper and pencil, which is inefficient 
and error-prone, and (ii) currently-fielded predesignation software is not user-friendly and 
produces predesignations that can be trivially improved by inspection.  Kuykendall uses an 
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 integer program that considers single-firing unit or battle group follow-on strike capability to 
produce a non-trivial allocation scheme.  This scheme yields better solutions than the manual 
predesignation scheme in a significantly shorter amount of time.  Kuykendall considers both 
surface ships, and submarines that fire Tomahawk weapons from their torpedo tubes.  Kirk 
[1999] proposes an optimization model for automatic surface ship predesignation at the fleet 
level.  His mixed-integer linear program is based on the list of priorities, presented below in 
descending order of importance: 
1. Make a complete allocation of tasks to firing units. 
2. Minimize the use of firing units already occupied with other operations or 
not in geographical proximity to the strike. 
3.  Maximize the allocation of tasks to expend units, i.e., those firing units 
soon leaving the theater of operation. 
4.  Level the remaining tasks across non-expend firing units, i.e., those firing 
units remaining in theater. 
5. Spread primary task parts across as many firing units as possible to 
prevent single-point failures among primary tasking. 
6. Spread backup task parts across as many firing units as possible to 
prevent single-point failures among backup tasking. 
7.  Allow for the use of the least capable missile for each mission. 
8.  Maximize residual salvo capacity. 
 
Kirk applies three solution methods to his model.  First, he attempts to solve the model as a 
“single, monolithic problem.”  This approach, he discovers, is computationally impractical.  
Next, he approaches the problem using a hierarchical restriction method, which consists of 
solving the monolithic problem as a series of sub-problems, ordered with respect to the priority 
of each objective.  This approach produces solutions of reasonable quality, but not in an 
operationally feasible amount of time.  To reduce solution time, Kirk implements a simplified 
optimization-based heuristic, which produces solutions comparable to those of the hierarchical 
restriction method, but in significantly less time.  Nonetheless, the solution time of the algorithm 
is still too long to be practical for implementation.  Based on Kirk’s work, Hodge [1999] 
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 develops a non-optimization-based heuristic, which reduces solution times, though at the 
expense of solution quality. 
Arnold’s [2000] heuristic improves Hodge’s not only by modifying the algorithm to 
improve solution quality, but also by providing the TSC a choice for the method of task 
allocation, i.e., automatic, partial, or manual allocation, thus giving the TSC more control over 
the predesignation process.  The heuristic also ensures that a better solution cannot be achieved 
by a simple, one-complement interchange.  Arnold’s extension of the predesignation heuristic 
also includes SSNs as firing units.  Because both the SSN and the SSGN are submarine firing 
units that use CLS capsules, Arnold’s extension to include predesignation of CLS TLAMs on 
SSN firing units is most relevant to this technical report. 
Kubu [2001] enhances the heuristic by providing functions that aid the TSC in 
determining—in the event of an incomplete strike allocation—why a task or tasks cannot be 
allocated, and prescribing modifications to enable a complete allocation of tasks.  Wingeart 
[2001] validates the heuristic solutions with exercise data and demonstrates that the heuristic 
provides solutions superior to those of manual predesignation in fleet exercises. 
C. THE SSGN FIRING UNIT 
1. OHIO-Class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) 
Eighteen OHIO-class submarines, also known as Trident submarines, have entered naval 
service since the early 1980s.  Each Trident submarine has 24 vertical missile tubes that are used 
to store two variants of Trident missiles.  Trident C4 missiles are older and less capable than 
Trident D5 missiles.  The first eight Trident submarines carry exclusively the older C4 missiles, 
while the remaining 10 Trident submarines carry exclusively the newer D5 missiles. 
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 When the Nuclear Posture Review in 1993 reduced the number of Trident submarines 
from 18 to 14, the question arose as to what to do with the four oldest SSBNs, which still have 
over 20 years of service life remaining [Undersea Warfare, 2001].  The nuclear-powered guided 
cruise-missile submarine (SSGN) concept is a solution to the decision regarding the future of 
these submarines [Federation of American Scientists, 2002c].  Starting in FY 2002, Congress 
authorized funding “to begin the conversion of two Trident submarines into the SSGN (nuclear 
powered guided-missile submarine) configuration.”  The amount of funding allocated for this 
conversion preserves the option of converting two additional Trident submarines into SSGNs 
[Legislative Notice, 2001]. 
 
Figure 3 [Commander Submarine Group Nine, 2002].  The USS OHIO 
(SSBN 726) is the first of her class scheduled for conversion to SSGN in 
FY03. 
2. Concepts of Operation for the SSGN 
Tomahawk missiles onboard an SSGN will be stored in clusters of seven CLS capsules, 
the same as those used onboard CLS-equipped SSNs, inside at most 22 of the 24 missile tubes 
that had been used to store Trident missiles.  Currently, there are three possible missile loadout 
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 configurations for the SSGN, all of which correspond to missile inventories that far exceed the 
Tomahawk missile inventory of any extant Tomahawk firing units.  In all three configurations, 
the first two missile tubes would be permanently modified with attachments for Special 
Operations Forces (SOFs) vehicles and also with lockin/lockout trunks for diver access to and 
from the submarine.  In the Maximum Strike Configuration, the SSGN can be fully loaded with 
154 Tomahawks in the remaining 22 missile tubes.  The other two configurations are designed 
for a combination of TLAM strike and SOF missions.  In these two configurations, SOF vehicles 
attached to the first two missile tubes obstruct the opening of the missile muzzle hatches of 
adjacent missile tubes underneath them.  Hence, the corresponding obstructed missile tubes 
would then be used to stow various SOF equipment.  For the configuration in which two missile 
tubes are blocked, the SSGN would be loaded with 140 TLAMs; if four tubes were blocked, 126 
TLAMs would be loaded [Aronson, 1999].  Even though the SSGN has four torpedo tubes, to 
our knowledge, there are no plans to use the tubes for TLAM operations.  The SSGN will use 
these torpedo tubes for undersea warfare. 
The SSGN will share parts of the same missile launching system that the SSBN uses for 
launching Trident missiles.  For example, the SSGN will store TLAMs in missile tubes that 
previously stored Trident missiles.  Each missile tube has a missile muzzle hatch on top of the 
missile tube that is opened for missile launches from the tube.  For a Trident missile, there is a 
fiberglass enclosure under each missile muzzle hatch that prevents the Trident missile inside the 
missile tube from exposure to seawater before launch.  Unlike the Trident missile, however, the 
CLS capsule of a Tomahawk missile will have its own individual capsule enclosure.  Each 
Trident missile also has its own ejection system that propels the missile out of the submarine; 
each CLS capsule will have its own individual ejection system.  The Missile Compensation 
7 
 System adjusts the ballast of the submarine in order to compensate for the additional weight of 
the seawater in the missile tube after the missile launch.  This system will be used for the TLAM 
launches on the SSGN as well. 
 
Figure 4 [Undersea Warfare, 2002].  In all three SSGN configurations, the first two missile tubes are 
permanently modified such that Special Operations Forces (SOFs) vehicles can be attached to the exterior of 
the submarine and accessed via the missile tubes.  Each of the remaining twenty-two missile tubes contains a 
seven-pack of TLAMs arranged as shown in the magnified inset.  In the Maximum Strike Configuration 
pictured above, the SSGN is fully loaded with 154 Tomahawk missiles in 22 of 24 missile tubes.  The other 
two configurations have SOF vehicles that attach and dock on the back of the SSGN, rendering two or four 
additional missile tubes adjacent to the lockin/lockout trunks unavailable for TLAM launch.  The former 
configuration would have 140 TLAMs loaded in the SSGN, the latter 126 TLAMs. 
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 II. INCORPORATING THE SSGN IN THE PHASE 1 
PREDESIGNATION HEURISTIC 
A. POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
 We developed a set of SSGN operational constraints following guidance from NSWCDD 
agents of SP-23, the SSGN Program Office (Table 1).  We then presented these constraints to 
submarine officers and sailors during a site visit to Submarine Base Bangor, Washington, for 
critique and validation.  The next two sections discuss the results of the site visit. 
Table 1.  List of Candidate Constraints. 
Constraint Description Validated? 
1.  Number of Powered 
Up Missiles 
A maximum of 32* missiles 
may be powered up 
concurrently. 
Yes 
2.  Tube Hatch 
Open/Close Time 
A minimum of 8* seconds is required to 
raise or lower an SSGN tube hatch. 
Yes 
3.  Time Between 
Missile Launches 
A minimum of 20* seconds is required 
between missile launches. 
Yes 
4.  Number of Open 
Tubes  
Only 6* SSGN tube hatches may be 
open at any time. 
No 
5.  Starboard/Port Open 
Tube Imbalance 
An imbalance of open missile muzzle 
hatches between port and starboard 
missile tubes should not be allowed to 
exceed 2*. 
No 
6.  Forward/Aft Open 
Tube Imbalance 
An imbalance of open missile muzzle 
hatches between forward and aft missile 
tubes should be minimized. 
No 
7.  Marching Order  
If possible, SSGN missile tubes should 
be opened in a specific order due to the 
fact that both a forward and an aft 
missile tube crew monitor the opening 
and closing of the SSGN tube hatches. 
No 
8.  Total Number of 
Tubes Open 
Minimize the number of SSGN missile 
tubes that would be opened to execute 
the total strike mission. 
No 




 B. SITE VISIT TO SUBMARINE BASE BANGOR 
To better understand how SSGN missile operations can be incorporated into the TLAM 
predesignation heuristic, researchers from NSWCDD and an officer student at the Naval 
Postgraduate School visited Submarine Base Bangor, Washington, in April 2002.  The team 
presented background, current work, and future work on the SSGN Tomahawk predesignation 
program to junior enlisted, junior officers, chiefs, department heads, and commanders.  The 
discussion validated half of our operational constraints; the other half was considered 
operationally irrelevant. 
The team also visited the USS MICHIGAN (SSBN 727) berthed at Delta Pier in 
Submarine Base Bangor.  The MICHIGAN is designated for conversion to an SSGN.  An 
Assistant Weapons Officer on the USS MICHIGAN guided our tour through the forward and 
missile compartments of the MICHIGAN, with particular emphasis on the Strategic Weapons 
System (SWS) and supporting systems.  This was a unique opportunity for the team to appreciate 
the physical dimensions and layout of a candidate SSGN firing unit.  Furthermore, this tour 
helped elucidate the revised list of operational constraints for the SSGN. 
The project received full support and acceptance from submariners of all ranks who will 
be operating the SSGN.  The success of tour also vindicated the paradigm shift to improve 
communications and cooperation between designers and operators in a major operational 
program.  As a result of this site visit, the SSGN predesignation software will be more readily 
accepted by the operators and will better reflect operational considerations. 
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Figure 5 [DAQ, 2002].  The USS ALABAMA (SSBN 731) in the Explosive 
Handling Wharf (EHW) at Submarine Base Bangor with all of her missile 
muzzle hatches open. 
C. VALIDATION OF OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
Based on our site visit to Submarine Base Bangor, we present the results of our constraint 
validation with respect to Phase 1 predesignation below.  Valid constraints are those that the 
submarine community deemed operationally necessary; invalid constraints were those the 
community deemed unnecessary. 
1. Validated Constraints 
Constraint 1:  Number of Powered Up Missiles.  The constraint on the maximum number 
of missiles that may be powered up concurrently is 32 missiles.  This is a software restriction 
inherent to the fire control system, and is not limited to the SSGN.  The heuristic, as designed for 
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 SSNs, does not specify this constraint explicitly because it is implicitly considered by the fact 
that an SSN possesses only 12 CLS capsules and four torpedo tubes, allowing at most 16 
missiles to be simultaneously powered up and aligned.  Because the SSGN can carry 154 
TLAMs, omitting a constraint to explicitly account for the fire control limitation may result in 
the heuristic suggesting the powering up and aligning of a number of missiles that greatly 
exceeds the fire control limit. 
Constraint 2:  Tube Hatch Open and Close Time.  The timing for opening each missile 
muzzle hatch is set by an adjustable throttling valve that controls the flow of hydraulics to the 
hatch, and is a relevant operational restriction.   
Constraint 3:  Time Between Missile Launches.  A time separation between missile 
launches is required to allow seawater to fill the empty canister after a missile is launched, and to 
allow any debris from the missile launch to drift clear of the missile tube so that it does not 
interfere with subsequent launches and missile muzzle hatch operations. 
2. Invalid Constraints 
Constraint 4:  Number of Open Tubes.  This constraint was allegedly based on limitations 
of the ship’s service hydraulic plant.  However, because the missile muzzle hatches are locked 
open during missile launch, the demand on the hydraulic plant is minimal, and, thus, all 24 
missile muzzle hatches can be open simultaneously. 
Constraint 5:  Starboard/Port Open Tube Imbalance.  This constraint was thought to 
minimize the impact of open missile tubes on the longitudinal stability of the SSGN.  However, 
because a Tomahawk missile displaces significantly less volume than a Trident missile, the 
effect of a TLAM launch on the roll of the SSGN due to the difference in weight before and after 
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 launch is insignificant.  Even if all seven TLAMs were launched from the same missile tube, the 
difference in weight is still negligible compared to that of a Trident missile. 
Constraint 6:  Forward/Aft Open Tube Imbalance.  This constraint was thought to 
consider the redundancy and reliability of the Ship’s Service Hydraulic System during missile 
launch.  The Ship’s Service Hydraulic System has two headers (for redundancy) that circulate 
hydraulic fluid to hydraulic loads throughout the submarine, including the hydraulically operated 
missile muzzle hatches.  One hydraulic header circulates hydraulics to the forward 12 missile 
tubes while the other header circulates hydraulics to the aft 12 missile tubes.  Maintaining a 
balance of hydraulic loads between the two headers is preferred, in general, in order to prevent 
overloading any one header.  However, because missile muzzle hatch operations are transient 
loads on the hydraulic system, they have minimal impact on the overall system reliability.  
Constraint 7:  Marching Order.  The basis for this constraint was to minimize procedural 
changes, and hence operator retraining, from launching Trident missiles to launching Tomahawk 
missiles.  During a Trident missile launch onboard an SSBN, two teams of missile technicians, 
each overseeing either the forward or aft missile tubes, position themselves around the missiles 
that are ready for launch.  Because of the confined space in the submarine, separating the tube 
teams into fore and aft groups with a corresponding ideal “marching order” prevents the teams 
from interfering with each other while monitoring the missile launch.  However, operating 
procedures other than subscribing to the traditional marching order can be developed to prevent 
tube teams from interfering with each other during a TLAM launch, and, in any case, operators 
would need minimal retraining to monitor a Tomahawk launch.  
Constraint 8:  Total Number of Tubes Open.  This constraint was intended to allocate 
tasks to missiles in the same tube to minimize the amount of time that a missile tube spends 
13 
 open.  However, based on Constraints 2 and 3, the missile muzzle hatch may be closed after a 
TLAM launch and re-opened before the next launch from the same tube, which minimizes open 
tube time regardless of the tubes from which missiles are launched.   
D. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
1. Data Input 
The subsequent paragraphs briefly describe the input data (Table 2) required by the 
heuristic.  These data are also required for the SSGN, its inventory, and tasks that are allocated to 
the SSGN. 
Table 2.  Input Data Required for the Predesignation Heuristic. 
Source of Data Data Required 
1.  Method of missile allocation 
2.  Missile loadout data 
3.  Current activities 
Firing Unit 
4.  Geographical position 
5.  Launch area 
6.  Number and type of missile required Task 
7.  Conflicts with other tasks 
8.  Capability Weapon 
9.  Value 
 
 
Input 1:  Currently, the heuristic permits three methods of missile allocation:   
(i) automatic allocation, i.e., the heuristic attempts to allocate all the tasks without user 
intervention, (ii) semi-automatic allocation, i.e., the user may allocate some tasks, and the 
heuristic completes the allocation, and (iii) manual allocation, i.e., the operator manually 
allocates all tasks without the use of the heuristic. 
Input 2:  Missile loadout data provide the heuristic information regarding the amount and 
types of Tomahawk missiles onboard the firing unit.   
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 Input 3:  A firing unit’s current activities indicate the relative importance of engaging in a 
TLAM strike as opposed to remaining on its current function. 
Input 4:  A firing unit’s geographic position determines whether the firing unit can launch 
one of its missiles in support of a strike. 
Input 5:  The area from which a Tomahawk missile must be launched to accomplish a 
task dictates which firing units are eligible to execute that task. 
Input 6:  The number and type of missile required for each task ensure that the firing unit 
to which the task is assigned has the requisite missiles to accomplish the task. 
Input 7:  The conflicts each task has with other tasks dictate which tasks can and cannot 
be assigned to missiles residing in the same half-module onboard the same firing unit. 
Input 8:  Each type of TLAM has a capability, and correspondingly, an inherent value 
depending on its variant and warhead type. 
2. Constraints 
We now review the relevance of the current predesignation constraints [Kirk, 1999] to the 
heuristic, given SSGN considerations.  Some constraints, e.g., the half-module constraint, are 
obviously irrelevant to the SSGN.  Others, e.g., accounting for the number of Tomahawk tasks 
that have been assigned to a firing unit, are independent of the SSGN.  Of interest to us are 
SSGN-relevant constraints that may need to be modified to incorporate the new firing unit.  The 
constraint numbering below corresponds to that in Kirk’s thesis. 
SALVOwfh is a binary variable in Kirk’s model that indicates whether or not, after a 
strike, any weapon of type w remains on firing unit f in half-module h.  Constraint 16 states:  
“The variable SALVOwfh is restricted to equal zero if all missiles in a half-module have been 
expended, for each firing [unit] and weapon type.”  This constraint remains unchanged for the 
15 
 SSGN given the correspondence between a CLS capsule onboard an SSGN with a given missile 
type and a half-module on a surface ship having only one missile of a given type.  That is, once 
the missile is launched from the SSGN, the CLS capsule is expended and the SALVO variable 
equals zero, as designed.  Constraints 17 and 21 ensure that half-module constraints are 
accurately accounted for.  Using the analogy that the SSGN contains “single-shot half-modules,” 
these constraints need no further modification for the SSGN. 
The following additional constraints are independent of firing unit type, or, in the last 
case, are irrelevant to the SSGN, and are not affected by the introduction of the SSGN: 











Constraints 3 and 4 require the firing unit to be in the same launch area as 
the primary and backup task parts, respectively.   
Constraint 5 ensures that a firing unit cannot launch missiles from more 
than one area.   
Constraint 6 accounts for the number of missiles selected from expend 
firing units. 
Constraints 7 through 10 count the number of missiles remaining on  
non-expend firing units after a strike. 
Constraints 11 and 12 assess the number of firing units that have been 
assigned primary task parts. 
Constraints 13 and 14 assess the number of firing units that have been 
assigned backup task parts. 
Constraint 15 accounts for the capability of the missile used vice what was 
necessary to use. 
Constraints 18 through 20 enforce the definitions of ready-spare and 
backup missile assignments. 
Constraint 22 ensures that only one missile may be selected for a task part. 
Constraint 23 ensures only one missile per set of conflicting tasks may be 
assigned to a half-module.  
 
Therefore, based on our review of the constraints, we conclude that all of the above 
SSGN-relevant constraints remain unaffected by the incorporation of the SSGN into the 
predesignation heuristic.   
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 3. Scoring Methods 
Recall that Arnold [2000] enhances the predesignation heuristic by including submarines, 
inter alia.  Hence, we now review the way in which Arnold incorporated SSNs, specifically, the 
way in which tasks are selected for predesignation to missiles onboard SSNs, to assess any 
differences in task assignment by using SSGNs for these predesignations.  
Arnold’s heuristic makes task allocations to firing units according to a set of hierarchical 
objectives and uses a spread-ship scoring method.  This scoring method assigns different point 
values to each half-module, capsule, torpedo tube, and cell in order to quantify the value of each 
with respect to achieving the hierarchical goals [Arnold, 2000].  “Spread-ship scoring assigns 
two points to a firing unit for every half-module, CLS capsule, and torpedo tube that does not 
have a primary task part assigned to it, and it assigns one point for every cell, capsule, or torpedo 
tube that does not have an assigned primary task part” [Arnold, 2000].  These two separate point 
assignments are made to avoid conflicts between tasks (on surface ships) and to maintain 
residual firepower.  Using the spread ship scoring method, the heuristic assigns the primary task 
part to the missile with the highest spread-ship score.  Then, the heuristic assigns ready-spare and 
backup task parts to the same or another firing unit, respectively, with the next highest scores.  
Because the SSGN has significantly more capacity than any other firing unit, we examine 
whether this scoring method is appropriate for the SSGN. 
To this end, we consider the following example.  We compare a strike launched with two 
expend firing units, one of which is an SSGN and the other a Ticonderoga class cruiser.  Suppose 
that the SSGN carries 154 TLAMs and the cruiser carries 32 TLAMs.  Two conflicting tasks 
requiring the same missile type need to be assigned.  Task 1 requires primary, ready-spare, and 
back-up task parts of, e.g., Block IIC, missiles.  Task 2 requires primary and ready-spare task 
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 parts only, also Block IIC.  Based on spread-ship scoring, the SSGN receives a maximum 
possible 462 points ( = 22 tubes × 7 CLS capsules per tube × 3 spread-ship points per capsule).  
The Ticonderoga receives a maximum possible 186 points ( = 32 half-modules × 2 points per 
half-module + 122 cells × 1 point per cell).  Hence, primary task parts are assigned to the SSGN, 
while back-up task parts are assigned to an “other firing unit,” in this case, the Ticonderoga class 
cruiser.  Now suppose the SSGN conducts subsequent TLAM strikes until 62 missiles remain 
onboard the SSGN, while the cruiser fires no (more) TLAMs.  At this point, the SSGN’s  
spread-ship score, 186, ( = 62 capsules × 3 points per capsule) is equal to that of the cruiser’s 
(assuming the redundant missiles of the first two tasks were not fired).  Given additional 
conflicting tasks to be assigned in the same strike, either firing unit may now be selected for 
primary task part assignment.  This allocation result agrees with the operational concept for 
which the SSGN is conceived—a submarine is capable of launching an overwhelming cruise 
missile strike, and the allocation method also serves the purpose of balancing TLAM inventories 
among firing units. 
The heuristic defines the total penalty for a firing unit as the sum of its geographic and 
employment penalties.  The heuristic uses a total penalty ratio to prioritize the order in which 
firing units are selected to receive tasks.  The firing unit-TLAM-penalty ratio, R, is the ratio of 
the total penalty of the firing unit divided by the number of TLAMs onboard the firing unit 
[Arnold, 2000].  If a task cannot be assigned to any firing unit with a zero R-value, the heuristic 
considers firing units for task assignment in increasing order of their R-values [Arnold, 2000].  
Suppose we have an SSGN and a Ticonderoga-class cruiser that have equal total penalties; the 
SSGN has more TLAMs onboard than the Ticonderoga-class cruiser, and correspondingly, a 
smaller R-value.  Therefore, the heuristic would assign a task to an SSGN, rather than to the 
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 cruiser, ceteris paribus.  This selection is consistent with the concept of operation for the SSGN 
discussed directly above. 
E. ALGORITHM SPECIFICATION 
Salmeron [2002a, b, c] develops an algorithm specification based on prior TLAM 
predesignation thesis work.  He proposes the use of an Entity Relationship Model to characterize 
the data structure of the heuristic algorithm (HA) and to identify various algorithm components 
as entities.  For example, because the SSGN is a submarine firing unit in the HA, it is 
characterized by a Submarine entity in the Entity Relationship Model.  Similarly, a task in the 
HA is represented by a Task entity in the Entity Relationship Model. 
In addition to defining entities, the Entity Relationship Model also defines the proper 
relationships between the entities.  There are two types of relationships between entities.  The 
first type of relationship is the “one-to-many” relationship, i.e., an entity of one type may relate 
to one or more entities of another type.  For example, for an SSGN with 154 TLAMs, a 
Submarine entity representing the SSGN relates to 154 Weapon entities.  The second type of 
entity relationship is the “many-to-many” relationship, i.e., one or more entities of one type may 
relate to one or more entities of another type.  For example, the relationships between tasks and 
task parts are represented by many-to-many relationships between Task entities and Part entities.  
In order to maintain consistency in the data and execution to the heuristic, many-to-many 
relationships in the data model are decomposed into two one-to-many relationships by using an 
intermediate entity.  Hence, for example, the relationships between Weapon entities and 
Submarine entities are decomposed using Submarine-Weapons entities as intermediaries. 
Salmeron organizes entity attributes in tables.  Each entity data table has a table 
identifier, and the field descriptors in each table represent data input, output and other 
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 calculations that are passed between entities [Salmeron, 2002a].  The entity attributes include 
user-defined parameters such as firing unit name, number and types of TLAMs onboard the 
firing unit, and the number of cells and torpedo tubes in which Tomahawk missiles are stored on 
the firing unit.  Hence, for a Submarine entity representing an SSGN, the number of torpedo 
tubes designated for TLAMs is zero, and the number of capsules stored onboard can be specified 
as having a maximum value of 154.  Similarly, in the Submarine-Weapon entity data table 
associated with the Submarine entity representing the SSGN, the attribute for the number of 
submarine weapons in the torpedo room is zero for the SSGN, and the attribute for the number of 
weapons of a single variant onboard the SSGN can be specified as having a maximum value of 
154.  We determine that these are the only entities in the data model affected by the 
incorporation of the SSGN. 
Salmeron [2002b] arranges the processes in the HA hierarchically by levels.  Superior 
processes in the HA call subordinate processes to perform calculations on attributes of entities in 
order to allocate task entities to firing unit entities.  For example, the process for finding a firing 
unit to allocate primary and ready-spare task parts calls subordinate processes to find the TLAMs 
in half-modules, torpedo tubes, and CLS capsules onboard all firing units.  Because the SSGN 
can be represented by the Submarine entity, the SSGN can be incorporated just like any other 
firing unit.  Furthermore, its incorporation does not affect the structure and/or processes already 
established for other firing units, e.g., Ship entities, in the HA.   
In summary, because the SSGN is similar to an SSN with all its TLAMs in CLS capsules, 
the SSGN can be incorporated into the HA without restructuring the existing code specifications.  
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 III.  CONCLUSIONS 
This technical report examines the effect of incorporating the SSGN into the Tomahawk 
Phase 1 Predesignation heuristic algorithm.  We evaluate SSGN-specific constraints based on 
feedback from submarine officers and sailors at Naval Submarine Base Bangor, Washington.  
Specifically, we determine that in order to correctly incorporate SSGNs, the algorithm must 
account for constraints on the maximum number of missiles that can concurrently be powered 
up, the minimum amount of time required to open and close a hatch from which a Tomahawk 
missile is fired, and the minimum amount of time required between missile launches.  
Additionally, we consider how to adjust the data structures and model of the existing TLAM 
allocation decision support algorithm to incorporate the SSGN, and find that only minor 
modifications are necessary.  In summary, despite the SSGN’s large TLAM inventory, the 
predesignation heuristic can incorporate the SSGN as a submarine firing unit, similar to how the 
heuristic considers the SSN, in a manner that is consistent with the goals of the heuristic.   
 
Figure 6 [Undersea Warfare, 2001].  Artist's rendering of an SSGN firing 
Tomahawk cruise missiles.  Note the SOF vehicle attached to the SSGN just 
aft of the sail. 
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